How To Build an Undervoting Machine: Lessons from an Alternative Ballot Design by Greene, Kristen K. et al.
38
USENIX Journal of Election Technology and Systems (JETS)
Volume 1, Number 1 • August 2013
How To Build an Undervoting Machine: Lessons from an Alternative 
Ballot Design
KRISTEN K. GREENE, RICE UNIVERSITY*
MICHAEL D. BYRNE, RICE UNIVERSITY
STEPHEN N. GOGGIN, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
Despite the importance of usability in ensuring election integrity, it remains an under-studied aspect of voting systems. 
Voting computers (a.k.a. DREs) offer the opportunity to present ballots to voters in novel ways, yet this space has not been 
systematically explored. We constructed a DRE that, unlike most commercial DREs, does not require voters to view every 
race, but instead starts at the “review screen” and lets voters directly navigate to races. This was compared with a more 
traditional, sequentially-navigated, DRE. The direct access navigation model had two effects, both of which were quite 
large. First, voters made omission (undervote) errors markedly more often. Second, voters who were free to choose who to 
vote for chose to vote in substantially fewer races. We also examined the relationship between the true error rate—which is 
not observable in real elections—and the residual vote rate, a measure of effectiveness commonly used for real elections. 
Replicating the findings of [Campbell and Byrne 2009a], the mean residual vote rate was close to the mean true error rate, 
but the correlation between these measures was low, suggesting a loose coupling between these two measures.
1. INTRODUCTION
One of the most obviously desirable qualities of a voting system is that it accurately measures the 
intent of the voters. With the advent of direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines, the 
concern for accuracy has been raised in the form of discussions about computer security, since 
most commercial DREs are susceptible to various form of attack, including computer viruses, e.g., 
[Ohio Secretary of State 2007]. While security concerns have led many states to move away from 
DREs towards optical scan paper-ballots, there are several compelling reasons why DREs remain 
an important research area. For example, with electronic technology, there exists signiﬁcant 
potential for accessibility accommodations that traditional paper-based systems cannot offer; there 
will always be a need for systems that support advances in accessible technology. From a much 
broader research perspective, DREs offer the opportunity to present ballots to voters in novel 
ways, yet this space has not been systematically explored. Without understanding how speciﬁc 
design features—such as navigation style—impact usability of known voting systems, we will 
have no baseline data against which to evaluate emerging and future voting methods. For obvious 
reasons, experimental manipulations of potentially signiﬁcant ballot design features are neither 
feasible nor desirable in real-world elections, lest the will of some voters be more accurately 
reﬂected than others. By conducting a mock election in a controlled setting, we were able to gather 
both objective and subjective usability data across multiple voting systems (two DREs with 
different navigation styles, paper ballots, punch cards, and lever machines) at a much ﬁner level of 
granularity than is possible in a real election. The laboratory environment also allowed a 
comparison of true voter error with the indirect measure commonly used in political science, i.e., 
the residual vote. 
Studies outside the laboratory, such as archival studies of voting records from enormous 
samples of counties across multiple elections utilize “residual votes” as the measure for error. 
[Stewart 2006] regards it as “a measure of voting machine accuracy that was ﬁrst championed by 
the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project in 2001 and has been regularly used ever since...” 
These residual vote rate studies, while important, often neglect to examine the different types of 
voter errors, and utilize different methodologies for counting errors. 
For instance, [Ansolabehere and Stewart 2005] found that the types of voting technologies in 
use have an impact on under- or overvote occurrences, or the residual vote rate. Ansolabehere and 
Stewart found clear differences between technologies in terms of the residual vote rate, with the 
results differing based on the location of the race on the ballot. Speciﬁcally, they found that punch 
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cards created the most residual votes for presidential races, yet lever machines produced the 
highest rates for down-ballot races. Optical scan ballots perform best at presidential, or top-of-the-
ballot races, while there is a three-way tie between optical scan, DRE, and traditional paper ballots 
for lowest residual vote rate among down-ballot races. Importantly, Ansolabehere and Stewart (p. 
378), unlike most other studies in Table 1, note the importance of a race’s place on the ballot, 
stating that “which machine is ‘best’ appears to depend, in part, on which race you are studying.” 
While [Ansolabehere and Stewart 2005], as well as [Traugott et al. 2005] note the differences in 
residual vote rate among different races on the ballot, neither study focuses on these differences.
These results highlight an important problem with using the measure of residual votes for the 
metric of effectiveness in studying voting machine usability. Because residual vote rates include 
both undervotes and invalid overvotes (or spoiled ballots), they are sensitive to the effects of ballot 
roll-off, and do not provide as precise a measure as possible in the laboratory. While ballot roll-off 
rates, estimated for DREs and voters in such articles as [Nichols and Strizek 1995] or [Kimball et 
al. 2001] could be controlled for in the residual vote rate, the residual vote rate is often not 
completely separated into its constituent parts. Any “switched,” or “wrong choice” ballots, in 
which a vote was cast for any candidate(s) other than the candidate(s) the voter intended, are not 
captured as error at all. As [Kimball and Kropf 2008] noted, residual vote rates on propositional 
measures are much higher than races at the top of the ballot, and while this may be driven by 
rational undervoting, aggregate data does not allow the separation of the residual vote into 
intentional and unintentional undervotes, let alone wrong choice votes and overvotes.
Furthermore, in massive archival studies of voting records using residual vote rates, reporting 
methods differ based on county and state, and often different rules must be applied to calculate the 
residual vote rate based on the information given by the election ofﬁcials. In nearly all studies, the 
measure of an undervote, is merely whether a voter left the ﬁrst race on the ballot blank. Often, 
this is the Presidential race in a Presidential election year. While it is likely that many who leave 
this race blank likely do so unintentionally, it is still feasible voters abstain intentionally, which 
would then be measured as error. 
Even if the residual vote rate is an accurate representation of the errors produced by voters in 
the election process, traditional studies of election technology in political science typically neglect 
the other two metrics of usability, efﬁciency and satisfaction. Usability is a multifaceted problem, 
as described clearly in a 2005 report from the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) [Laskowski et al. 2005], which recommends voting systems be evaluated by the ISO 
standard metrics of usability: effectiveness (for voting systems, accuracy), efﬁciency, and 
satisfaction. While some studies, such as [Stein et al. 2008] have examined the time it takes a voter 
to cast a ballot in the ﬁeld, no comprehensive ﬁeld studies have been able to record measures for 
all three metrics for the same voters. While this difﬁculty is due to election law and the privacy of 
the voter, alternative methodologies are available for studying voting machine usability, such as in 
the laboratory.
In 2006, Byrne, Everett, Greene and colleagues began collecting baseline usability data for 
traditional voting methods. Across the series of three usability studies [Everett et al. 2006; Greene 
et al. 2006; Byrne et al. 2007], they gathered baseline usability data for multiple forms of paper 
ballots, punch cards, and lever voting machines. Their research showed that on all technologies, 
error rates were high, across these three studies and multiple voting methods, between 11 and 26% 
of the ballots contained at least one error and error rates per-race were generally between 1 and 
4%. Furthermore, the differences between these technologies on objective measures of usability 
are not large, though they found some evidence that punch cards and lever machines are more 
error-prone for some populations, e.g., older voters tend to have more trouble with lever machines 
[Byrne et al. 2007]. However, these studies showed a small but consistent advantage for paper 
ballots in terms of subjective usability. 
In 2008, Everett and colleagues [Everett et al. 2008] report on laboratory studies that 
compared the usability of a new prototype DRE versus traditional voting methods (paper ballots, 
punch cards, and lever machines). While there were few differences between the DRE and the 
older voting methods on efﬁciency or effectiveness, participants were substantially more satisﬁed 
when using the DRE. The bubble ballot received high SUS scores as it had in prior research, but 
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with the addition of a DRE, the bubble ballot was no longer participants’ favorite voting method. 
Despite the large subjective advantage for DREs, participants’ objective performance was not any 
better with the DRE. This disassociation between subjective and objective usability has been seen 
in a number of domains [Bailey 1995, Neilsen 1995], and may have ramiﬁcations for election 
ofﬁcials who decide to return to traditional methods after having previously adopted DREs.
 [Herrnson et al. 2008] reports another substantial usability evaluation; they evaluated six 
electronic voting systems and four veriﬁcation systems using expert reviews, a laboratory 
experiment, and a ﬁeld study. The six commercial DREs included an ES&S Model 100, a Diebold 
Accuvote-TS, an Avante Vote-trakker, a Hart InterCivic eSlate, a Nedap Liberty Vote, and a 
Zoomable prototype system developed speciﬁcally for this research. Participants were asked to 
read a voter guide and circle their choices, then use the marked-up guide while voting. However, 
even though they were asked to make their own choices, for some races they were instructed on 
who to vote for, and were also asked to intentionally omit one down-ballot race, change a vote, 
and do a write-in. 
When using a standard ofﬁce-bloc ballot design and performing no special tasks, voters cast 
their ballots accurately over 97% of the time. In this scenario, there was little difference between 
voting systems in terms of accuracy. However, attempting to select multiple candidates, change a 
selection, and vote straight-party ticket caused accuracy to drop sharply, down to the range of 
80-90%. Most importantly, differences in accuracy between voting systems were then seen. For 
example, accuracy for the Hart InterCivic system was only 72% and accuracy for the Avante was 
much worse, at 50%. Soberingly, roughly 20% of voters cast ballots that were not completely 
accurate. Despite this, all six DREs were viewed favorably by voters, who had relatively high 
conﬁdence with the commercial DREs. In fact, voters were more conﬁdent with touch screens than 
with paper, and also judged touch screens as more trustworthy than paper. [Herrnson et al. 2008]
Unfortunately, the 2008 study by Herrnson et al. did not evaluate the efﬁciency of the various 
systems; ballot completion times were not recorded. An additional study limitation was the use of 
a non-standardized questionnaire to assess voter satisfaction. Use of a standardized instrument, 
such as the System Usability Scale [Brooke 1996], would have facilitated comparison of results 
across studies and technologies. Finally, the experimental procedures used were somewhat 
artiﬁcial. Having participants make their own selections, yet instructing them to change those 
selections in speciﬁc ways, is not a task scenario that is representative of what most voters 
experience in a real election. Despite these methodological limitations, the 2008 study by 
Herrnson et al. is an important landmark it the study of voting system usability and provides an 
important reference point for future research, including its focus on the separation of types of voter 
errors to include undervotes, overvotes, and “wrong choice” votes. 
So, while there has been some recent research which has advanced our understanding of 
voting system usability, a great deal more research is needed. Our current research is aimed at two 
issues: ﬁrst, we want to widen the space of inquiry into DRE design. The [Herrnson et al. 2008] 
research demonstrates that the differences between various DREs, while meaningful, are mostly 
not large (with some exceptions), and some of these differences are almost certainly exacerbated 
by the requirement that voters make a selection and then change it. While looking at commercial 
DREs is certainly valuable, it is also limited because most commercial DREs use similar designs 
for many functions. For instance, most DREs use touchscreen-activated textual buttons rather than 
alternatives like handwriting recognition, presentation of images rather than text, or other non-
traditional designs. These design features are likely motivated by a desire (sometimes driven by 
state laws regarding ballot design) to keep the voting experience isomorphic to more traditional 
presentation on a paper ballot, but there are aspects of the paper ballot experience that are not 
captured in commercial DREs. In particular, most major commercial DREs present the ballot 
sequentially: that is, the race for Representative follows the race for Senator which follows the 
race for President. While a paper ballot typically also presents races in this order, voters can 
typically see all (or most) of the races simultaneously and can make their selections in whatever 
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order they wish.1 Does giving voters the same ﬂexibility with a DRE alter usability? It is clear that 
navigability is a critical factor in the usability of other systems such as Web sites—perhaps this 
applies to ballots as well.
Second, we want to further clarify the relationship between residual votes and true error rates 
through experimental work. Residual vote rate is an indirect measure of error; in an experiment, 
error can be more directly assessed. How well does residual vote rate compare to true error rate? 
Some work on this has already been published. e.g., [Campbell and Byrne 2009] showing that 
while the overall average residual vote and true error rates may be similar, the variability in one is 
not mirrored by the other. That is, when ballots are aggregated, the total residual vote proportion 
and the true error proportion may be similar, but this is not true at the individual ballot level; the 
correlation between the residual vote rate and the true error rate was found to be low. We wanted 
to further explore this relationship.
2. EXPERIMENT
2.1 Method
Participants. Sixty-four participants (30 male, 34 female) from the greater Houston, TX area 
were recruited through newspaper and online ads for participation in a mock election study. Ages 
ranged from 18 to 77 years, with a mean age of 50.3 (SD = 14.8). There was reasonable variability 
in terms of participant ethnicity, annual income, and education. 
Design. The primary independent variable of interest was navigation style for the DRE, which 
was manipulated between subjects with random assignment. In addition to the sequential 
navigation style used in most commercial DREs and other studies—e.g. [Everett et al. 2008]—a 
“direct access” navigation style was also used. Half of participants voted with a sequential DRE; 
the other half voted with a direct access DRE. Each participant voted twice with either the 
sequential or the direct access DRE system. Both DREs had the same 27 contests, comprised of 21 
candidate races and six propositions. The direct access DRE was similar to a webpage, in that all 
race titles appeared on its Main Page and acted as hyperlinks; see Figure 1. From the Main Page, a 
voter could click on the race titles to pick and choose exactly the races s/he wanted to see, with the 
option to skip races and go straight to the Record Vote screen at any time; see Figures 2 and 3 for a 
candidate race screen and the Record Vote screen, respectively. Note that merely moving from the 
Main Page to the Record Vote screen did not cast the ballot. The Record Vote screen presented the 
voter with buttons allowing the voter to either return to the Main Page or to cast his/her vote by 
selecting the “Record Vote” button (Figure 3). 
In sharp contrast to the “pick and choose” navigation model of the direct access DRE, the 
sequential DRE forced voters to page sequentially through every race on the ballot—followed by a 
Review Choices screen much like the direct access DRE’s Main Page—before they could get to 
the Record Vote screen. While the overall navigation schemes differed substantially between 
DREs, their Record Vote screens were nearly identical. 
In addition to voting twice on a DRE, each subject voted on one of three other non-DRE 
methods: paper ballots, punch cards, or lever machines. Participants voted on the non-DRE system 
in between the two votes with the DRE. The assignment of participants to each level of this 
between-subjects variable was random.
A third independent variable was termed “information condition” and had four levels; 
participants were randomly assigned to one of these four. One level was termed “undirected;” in 
this condition participants were given a ﬁctional voter guide modeled after the guides provided by 
the League of Women Voters, identical to the one ﬁrst used in [Greene et al. 2006]. This guide 
1 It is, in principle, possible to present all of the races simultaneously on a DRE, but doing so for many U.S. elections 
would require extremely large, and therefore prohibitively expensive, computer displays. Machines such as the AVC 
Advantage and the Nedap LibertyVote do in fact do this, using a display of lights paired with paper-printed text on a large 
face, controlled by a computer. These machines, while DREs, largely resemble other styles of traditional voting machines, 
such as lever-based machines, as the user interface is not a traditional computer display.
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provided speciﬁc information about each candidate for ofﬁce, in addition to arguments for and 
against the propositions on the ballot. Participants read this guide and then chose for themselves 
the candidates and propositions to vote for. The remaining three conditions were “directed” in that 
participants were given a list of candidates to vote for. In the “directed with no roll-off” condition, 
this list was complete, instructing voters to cast a vote in every race on the ballot. Other levels 
instructed voters to abstain in some races. “Directed with moderate roll-off” was based on the 
[Nichols and Strizek 1995] data on roll-off rates. We used the average roll-off rates for 
jurisdictions with electronic voting machines for the various ofﬁces: for federal ofﬁces (9.75%), 
for state ofﬁces (12.00%) and for county ofﬁces (16.37%). This was designed to more closely 
mimic real-world voting patterns in which people do not vote for every race on the ballot. The 
“directed with additional roll-off” condition used lists where each race had a 52% chance of being 
omitted in order to simulate voters who only vote in a few races in each election.
A more complete listing of the materials including screen shots for most of the DRE screens, 
the full ballot, the full voter’s guide, and example slates can be found at <http://chil.rice.edu/
research/jets13/>.
The three dependent variables measured were ballot completion time, errors, and satisfaction. 
Ballot completion time was measured in seconds, and indicated how long it took participants to 
complete each of their three ballots. In the directed information conditions, errors were recorded if 
a participant chose a candidate other than the one they were instructed to select, if they failed to 
make a choice for a race in which they were supposed to vote, or if they made a choice in a race 
they were supposed to skip. In the undirected information condition, errors were recorded if there 
was a discrepancy between responses on a subject’s three measures. Finally, satisfaction was 
measured using the System Usability Scale (SUS) [Brooke 2006], a ten-item battery of questions 
regarding subjective usability. Participants ﬁlled out three separate SUS questionnaires, one for 
each ballot they completed.
Errors were further broken down by error type: an error was a wrong choice error if the 
option selected was the incorrect one (e.g., a vote for Alice when a vote for Bob was intended). If 
a voter chose a candidate for a race s/he had planned to (or was instructed to) omit, this was 
considered an extra vote error. If a voter omitted a race that required a vote, this was considered 
an omission error. Finally, on the paper or punchcard systems, voters could vote for more choices 
than allowed, this was an overvote error.
In contrast with an undervote error, an intentional abstention occurred when a voter correctly 
abstained from voting in a race s/he had intended to skip. This is not an error, but is an important 
measure of voter behavior, as these would be counted as errors in the residual vote rate.
Procedures. Participants were ﬁrst given a set of written instructions explaining the purpose 
of the study, accompanied by either a slate of candidates they were directed to vote for or a 
ﬁctional voter guide. If given the guide, the participants were given as much time as they wanted 
to familiarize themselves with the political candidates and propositions. Once the participant 
indicated he or she was ready to begin, several key instructions were reiterated verbally. 
Participants were instructed to vote for the same candidates on all ballots. 
Participants voted ﬁrst on a DRE, then on one of the three non-DREs, then again on the DRE. 
This did away with the need for an exit interview in the undirected information condition. Finally, 
the participants ﬁlled out a longer questionnaire about their voting history and demographic 
information.
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Fig. 1. “Main Page” for the Direct Access DRE. 
Fig. 2. Candidate Race Screen for the Direct Access DRE.
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Fig. 3. Record Vote Screen for the Direct Access DRE.
2.2 Results
Efﬁciency. Data from six participants were not included in the efﬁciency analyses due to being 
outliers, deﬁned as observations falling outside three interquartile ranges (IQRs) from the 25th or 
75th percentiles of the distribution of ballot completion times. The most striking effects of 
navigation type on efﬁciency were seen in the undirected information condition, where ballot 
completion times for the sequential DRE were over twice as long as times for the direct access 
DRE: 453 seconds (SD=123) versus only 205 seconds (SD=119) . The interaction between 
navigation type and information condition, depicted in Figure 4, was statistically reliable, F(3, 34) 
= 5.26, p = .004, as was the main effect of navigation type, F(1, 34) = 11.4, p = .002. This result is 
inconsistent with previous results in that effect of voting system have generally been absent (or 
small); however, this result should not be considered in isolation from results on efﬁciency and 
intentional undervotes.
While navigation type had a signiﬁcant impact on efﬁciency, type of non-DRE voting method 
used did not.
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Fig. 4. Effects of DRE navigation style and information condition on ballot completion times 
Effectiveness. Data from six participants were not included in the effectiveness analyses due 
to being outliers, deﬁned as having greater than 15% errors on all three ballots they completed. 
This deﬁnition is in keeping with previous work [Byrne et al. 2007]. No overvotes were observed. 
Error rates for each voting technology are presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Mean Error Rates by Voting Technology and Type of Error
Technology Extra vote Omission Wrong choice Total error
Sequential DRE 0.0% 0.2% 1.1% 1.3%
Direct Access DRE 0.2% 13.1% 1.2% 14.5%
Bubble ballot 0.0% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4%
Lever machine 0.0% 0.6% 1.1% 1.7%
Punch card 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.2%
Most interesting was the extremely high undervote error rate for the direct access DRE, which 
was about 13%, as opposed to only 0.2% for the sequential DRE. The main effect of navigation 
type on error rates was reliable, F(1, 17) = 7.39, p = .02. The abnormally high undervote error rate 
for the direct access DRE can be explained by the number of people who cast their ballots 
prematurely with the direct access DRE. In comparison with more traditional voting methods, 
DREs offer opportunities for voters to commit two particularly severe errors. A voter can fail to 
cast their vote entirely by not pressing the “Record Vote” button at all. This happens in real 
elections, and has been termed the “ﬂeeing voter” problem [Felten 2009]. In a real election, when 
a voter fails to cast their vote, there is still a chance that the next voter or a poll worker will cast it 
for them. Of course, this is a function of the behavior of the next voter, the poll worker, and voting 
laws in the jurisdiction. A malicious next voter could see that the machine was left in an un-cast 
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state, change all the selections, and effectively vote twice, though this is illegal in most 
jurisdictions. Alternatively, the voter could get a poll worker, who in some jurisdictions is allowed 
to cast the vote, and in others is required to cancel the vote, therefore disenfranchising the voter 
who ﬂed.
In this study, if a participant failed to cast their ballot, we cast it for them and counted their 
choices as intended. In contrast with failing to cast a vote at all, a voter can cast their vote 
prematurely, by pressing the “Record Vote” button too soon. This is also quite problematic, for 
when a vote is cast prematurely, voters irreversibly rob themselves of the opportunity to vote in 
some or all of the races on a ballot. 
Of the 32 people who used the sequential DRE, only two people failed to cast their vote 
(6.3%), and not a single person cast their vote too soon. However, of the 32 people who used the 
direct access DRE, four people failed to cast their vote (12.5%), and eight people cast their vote 
too soon (25%). The number of races erroneously omitted due to premature ballot casting varied, 
and in several cases, no choices at all had been made when the ballot was cast. The direct access 
DRE had a signiﬁcantly greater “cast too soon” error rate than did the sequential, F(1, 62) = 4.33, 
p = .002. 
Intentional Abstentions. In a real election, it is impossible to discern whether an omission was 
an error on the part of the voter, or whether it was intentional. The controlled nature of this mock 
election allowed a distinction to be made between undervote errors and intentional undervotes. 
The intentional abstention rates reported here are for the undirected information condition only. 
Such rates are not of interest for the directed information conditions, in which participants were 
not allowed to make their own decisions regarding abstentions. 
There was quite a large disparity in intentional undervote rates between the sequential and 
direct access DREs. Participants who used the sequential DRE almost never abstained from a race, 
resulting in an intentional abstention rate of 0.7% for those voters. In sharp contrast, those who 
used the direct access DRE abstained from nearly half of all races, with an intentional undervote 
rate of 45.4%, a dramatic difference, F(1, 14) = 6.94, p = .02.
Residual Vote versus True Error Rate. Of great interest was the relationship between the 
study’s true error rate (a direct measure of effectiveness) with what would have been reported as 
the residual vote (an indirect measure) in a real-world election. The residual vote in our analysis is 
comprised of overvote errors, omission errors, and intentional abstentions. The residual vote does 
not include any information about wrong choice errors because it is impossible to identify such 
errors without knowing voter intent, something which is impractical to do in real elections due to 
privacy concerns. For the same reason, the residual vote cannot differentiate between omission 
errors and intentional abstentions. The residual vote rate was then compared to our measure of the 
true overall error rate, i.e. the “total” error rate, which was comprised of extra vote errors, 
overvotes, omission errors, and wrong choice errors combined. Comparisons between the residual 
vote rate versus the true error rate were done for the undirected information condition only, as 
voters the directed conditions did not have the option to choose their own abstention opportunities. 
It is common to compare accuracy between voting systems by focusing on the top-ballot residual 
vote rate, since intentional abstention rates are known to increase for down-ticket races. Therefore, 
comparisons between what would have been reported as the residual vote rate versus the true error 
rate are shown separately for the Presidential race (Figure 5) and all other down-ballot races 
(Figure 6). Given the extremely large intentional abstention rate for those voters using the direct 
access DRE, residual vote rates and error rates are also broken down by navigation type. 
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Fig. 5. Top-ballot (e.g., Presidential) residual votes and true error rates for the sequential navigation DRE and the direct 
access navigation DRE 
The correlation between the residual vote and true error rate for the Presidential race was not 
signiﬁcant for sequential navigation, r(6) = -.14, p = .74, nor was the difference between means 
reliable, t(7) = 0.00, p = 1.00. A similar pattern of results for the presidential race was observed for 
direct access navigation: the correlation between the residual vote and true error rate was not 
signiﬁcant, r(6) = .41, p = .32, nor was the difference in means, t(7) = 1.00, p = .35.
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Fig. 6. Down-ballot residual votes and true error rates for the sequential navigation DRE and the direct access navigation 
DRE 
Similarly, the correlation between the residual vote and true error rate for the remaining 
down-ballot races was not signiﬁcant when navigation type was sequential, r(6) = .22, p = .60. 
Again, the difference in means was not reliable, t(7) = .43, p = .68. When navigation type was 
direct access, the correlation between the down-ballot residual vote and true error rates was not 
signiﬁcant, r(6) = .16, p = .70, nor was there a signiﬁcant difference in means, t(7) = 1.64, p = .15. 
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These non-signiﬁcant correlations suggest the residual vote may not be as tightly coupled to the 
true error rate as has often been assumed.
 Satisfaction. Data from two participants were excluded due to being outliers, deﬁned as any 
point falling outside three IQRs from the 25th or 75th percentiles of the SUS scores distribution. 
The sequential DRE consistently received higher SUS scores than did the direct access DRE, 
see Figure 7; the effect of navigation type on SUS scores was reliable, F(1, 38) = 9.53, p = .004. 
Although differences in SUS scores were seen as a result of changing DRE navigation style, 
information condition did not signiﬁcantly impact subjective usability. 
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Fig. 7. Mean subjective usability (SUS) scores for sequential vs. direct access DREs
Consistent with multiple other studies, the sequential DRE received the highest mean SUS 
score of any voting method; ratings for the non-DRE voting methods overall were lower than 
ratings for the DREs. This is depicted in Figure 8. Unsurprisingly, all three pairwise differences 
between the DRE and the other methods were statistically reliable, p < .05 in each case.
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Fig. 8. Mean SUS scores for sequential DRE versus non-DRE voting methods
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3. DISCUSSION
Exploration of alternatives in terms of ballot presentation has the potential to be valuable. From a 
user interface perspective, many DRE systems are essentially electronic implementations of paper 
ballots and do not take advantage of alternatives made possible by the electronic medium, such as 
alternate navigation models. We attempted to make a foray into this space, and examined a 
navigation style more like the Web. However, manipulation of a that single design feature—how 
the ballot was navigated—resulted in substantial effects on both subjective and objective usability. 
The lesson here is that changes in one aspect of the voting interface can have far-reaching 
consequences in terms of overall system usability. This should raise serious concerns about other 
purportedly small changes in voting procedures—such changes can have substantial impacts and 
no such changes should be deployed without being thoroughly tested for their effects on usability. 
For instance, there are a variety of proposals in the literature for voting systems with “end to end” 
veriﬁability (e.g., Prêt à Voter [Ryan, et al. 2009]) that introduce changes to the voting procedure. 
The usability ramiﬁcations of these changes have not been thoroughly tested, and it is not 
unreasonable to wonder if they have similar impacts.
In our case, intentional abstention rates, efﬁciency, effectiveness, and satisfaction were all 
greatly impacted simply by changing the DRE navigation style from sequential to direct access. 
When allowed to choose candidates for themselves in the undirected information condition, 
participants with the sequential DRE voted in almost every race, whereas participants using the 
direct access DRE abstained from nearly half of all races. Voting in so few races made the direct 
access DRE signiﬁcantly faster than the sequential, but this increase in speed came at a 
tremendously high cost in accuracy. The direct access DRE had a much greater omission error rate 
than any of the other voting methods, and was plagued by a new type of error: voters frequently 
cast their ballots prematurely with the direct access DRE. While some voters cast their ballot too 
early, others failed to cast their ballot at all, replicating the real-world “ﬂeeing voter” phenomenon 
in the laboratory. 
	
 That the results were so large was certainly unexpected. The change in navigation model 
generated substantial amounts of undervotes, both erroneous omissions and intentional 
abstentions. It is possible that some kind of visual cue to highlight races that had not yet been 
voted, such as the bright orange coloration employed by [Campbell and Byrne 2009a] to improve 
anomaly detection might also better alert voters to those races that they had not yet voted in. 
However, this seems somewhat unlikely, as when the voter ﬁrst starts using the interface, all races 
would be ﬂagged this way, so nothing would stand out. This is most likely to help only when there 
are a few isolated incomplete races. This does not imply that all visual UI manipulations would in 
principle be ineffective, but it seems unlikely that there is a simple visual ﬁx on the main screen.
We strongly suspect that it is the sequential presentation that forces voters to see every single 
race that encourages voters to consider each race, making them much more likely to choose to cast 
a vote. However, this raises issues of scale. Our ballot was designed to represent an average length 
ballot in a U.S. election, but there is considerable variance in this measure and in some 
jurisdictions, ballots can be more than 100 contests long. How such a long ballot would be 
handled in a direct access DRE is not entirely clear. In order to maintain a readable font size, races 
would either have to be broken across multiple pages or the interface would have to support 
scrolling. Recent research [Campbell, 2013] suggests that a paginated display is likely to be better, 
but neither of these circumstances would be ideal.
One of the methods deployed in some jurisdictions to help alleviate the time taken for long 
ballots is the straight-party voting (SPV) option. This is currently available in roughly 16 U.S. 
states. This allows voters to make a single selection of a political party that then applies to all 
contests in which a member of that party is a valid option. There is evidence that the SPV option 
contributes to higher error rates on ballots [Campbell and Byrne 2009b, Herrnson et al. 2012] and 
it is not at all clear how SPV would interact with the direct access navigation model, as we did not 
provide an SPV option to voters in this experiment.
Given our result that the direct access DRE results in signiﬁcantly more intentional 
abstention, one might argue this navigation style is not ideal, and that encouraging abstention is 
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not a desirable quality for a voting machine. The argument presented here is that we should ideally 
separate intentional abstention from unintentional undervoting, as including the former in residual 
error rates categorizes an intentional behavior with an error. What is an error is a normative 
argument contingent on the goals for our democratic instruments, and a highly debatable one. 
While some empirical work has examined hypothetical scenarios of election outcomes under full 
(hypothetically forced) turnout [e.g., Citrin et al. 2003], particularly Senate outcomes and not 
further down-ballot races, whether encouraging rational abstention should be a goal of an election 
system is a normative question we leave aside. 
It is not immediately clear how this situation could be improved for any future direct access 
DRE. More visually salient highlighting of undervotes, as in [Campbell and Byrne, 2009a], might 
serve to better alert voters that some races have not been ﬁlled in. However, since many voters do 
abstain, particularly in down-race ballots, the issue is not simply whether there are any undervoted 
races, but whether only the intended abstentions are missing. Additional prompting of the voter 
when they attempt to cast the ballot (e.g., a warning message such as “There are contests for which 
you have made no selection. Are you sure you want to submit your ballot?”) seems similarly 
ineffective exactly because some level of intentional abstention is not unusual. Sequential ballot 
presentation is likely a better solution.
This raises other interesting questions about what can or should be done to reduce 
unintentional abstention in other ballot formats. There is little that could be done with paper 
ballots (or punch cards), but sequential DREs could be programmed to not accept a ballot that did 
not have all races marked. In order to allow intentional abstentions, an explicit “abstain” option 
would have to be added to each contest. This style of ballot would likely run into legal problems in 
many U.S. jurisdictions. While as far as we know, no data on usability for such a system has ever 
been published, such a conﬁguration could be quite onerous for voters, particularly those voters 
faced with many races who intend to abstain in most of the contests.
As noted in other research, participants were highly satisﬁed with their experience using the 
sequential DRE. Despite receiving signiﬁcantly higher subjective usability ratings than any other 
method, there were no corresponding objective beneﬁts to using the sequential DRE. Although 
voters preferred it, they were neither faster nor more accurate with it than with any of the older 
technologies. 
Another issue that warrants closer scrutiny is the utility of the residual vote as a measure of 
accuracy. Consistent with [Campbell and Byrne 2009a], our data indicate that the residual vote and 
the true error rate may not be as tightly coupled as has traditionally been assumed. In both this 
experiment and Campbell and Byrne, the mean error rate generated by both measures was 
approximately the same. So, for use as a tool to detect large-scale problems across many voter, the 
residual error rate is indeed probably a good tool. It appears that, on average, the overall rate of 
wrong choice errors (included in the true error rate but not the residual vote rate) somewhat 
mirrors the intentional abstention rate (included in the residual vote rate but not the true error rate). 
There are probably circumstances where this breaks down, but as a low-precision tool, the use of 
residual vote rate is probably not a serious problem.
However, the near-zero correlation observed between residual vote rate and true error rate at 
the ballot level is cause for some concern. This suggests that the residual vote is incapable of 
identifying individual ballots, or probably even subsets of ballots, that contain errors. While wrong 
choice errors and intentional abstentions balance out in the aggregate, they do not do so at the 
level of individual ballots. Further research on the exact nature of this relationship is clearly 
warranted. Of course, this requires further laboratory research since the true error rate cannot be 
known in a real election for privacy reasons. Voting studies run in the laboratory environment, 
such as those reported here, complement ﬁeld research and can shed light on issues that are 
impossible to address during real elections, such as the accuracy of the residual vote and 
evaluation of experimental voting system designs. The laboratory setting allows for more granular 
measurement of the objective and subjective facets of usability, both of which are important for 
meaningful comparisons of voting methods over time. Regardless of whether voting is electronic 
or paper-based, we must ﬁrst understand the design space of our current systems before we can 
predict and evaluate the usability of emerging and future voting methods.  
51
USENIX Journal of Election Technology and Systems (JETS)
Volume 1, Number 1 • August 2013
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This research was supported by the National Science Foundation under grant #CNS-0524211 (the 
ACCURATE center). The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and 
should not be interpreted as representing the ofﬁcial policies or endorsements, either expressed or 
implied, of the NSF, the U.S. Government, or any other organization. 
REFERENCES
Ansolabehere, S. and Stewart, C. 2005. Residual Votes Attributable to Technology. The Journal of Politics. 
67, 2, 365–389.
Bailey, R. W. 1993 Performance vs. preference. In Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics 
Society 37th Annual Meeting, Human Factors and Ergonomics Society.
Brooke, J. 1996 SUS: A “quick and dirty” usability scale. In Usability Evaluation in Industry, P. W. Jordan, B. 
Thomas, B. A. Weerdmeester, and A. L. McClelland, (Eds.). New York: Taylor and Francis.
Byrne, M. D., Greene, K. K., and Everett, S. P. 2007 Usability of voting systems: Baseline data for paper, 
punch cards, and lever machines. In Human Factors in Computing Systems: Proceedings of CHI 2007, 
ACM.
Campbell, B. A. (2013). The Usability Implications of Long Ballot Content for Paper, Electronic, and Mobile 
Voting Systems. Doctoral dissertation, Rice University, Houston, TX.
Campbell, B. A. and Byrne, M. D. 2009a Now do voters notice review screen anomalies? A look at voting 
system usability. In 2009 USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology Workshop/Workshop on 
Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE), Montreal, Canada.
Campbell, B. A. and Byrne, M. D. 2009b. Straight party voting: What do voters think? IEEE Transactions on 
Information Forensics and Security. 4, 4, 718-728.
Citrin, J., Schickler, E., and Sides, J. 2003. What if everyone voted? Simulating the impact of increased 
turnout in Senate elections. American Journal of Political Science. 47, 1, 75-90.
Everett, S. P., Byrne, M. D., and Greene, K. K. 2006 Measuring the usability of paper ballots: Efﬁciency, 
effectiveness, and satisfaction. In Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 50th 
Annual Meeting, Human Factors and Ergonomics Society.
Everett, S. P., Greene, K. K., Byrne, M. D., Wallach, D. S., Derr, K., Sandler, D., and Torous, T. 2008 
Electronic voting machines versus traditional methods: Improved preference, similar performance. In 
Human Factors in Computing Systems: Proceedings of CHI 2008, ACM.
Felten, E. 2009. Finnish Court Orders Re-Vote After E-Voting Snafu. https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/
felten/ﬁnnish-court-orders-re-vote-after-e-voting-snafu/
Greene, K. K., Byrne, M. D., and Everett, S. P. 2006. A comparison of usability between voting methods. 
2006 USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology Workshop.
Herrnson, P. S., Hanmer, M. J., and Niemi, R. G. 2012. The impact of ballot type on voter errors. American 
Journal of Political Science. 56, 3, 716–730.
Herrnson, P. S., Niemi, R. G., Hanmer, M. J., Bederson, B. B., Conrad, F. C., and Traugott, M. W. 2008 
Voting technology: The not-so-simple act of casting a ballot. Brookings Institution Press.
Kimball, D. C. and Kropf, M. 2008. Voting Technology, Ballot Measures, and Residual Votes. American 
Politics Research. 36, 479–509.
Kimball, D. C., Owens, C., and McAndrew, K. 2001. Who’s Afraid of an Undervote? Annual meeting of the 
Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, GA.
Laskowski, S. J., Autry, M., Cugini, J., Killam, W., and Yen, J. 2004. Improving the Usability and 
Accessibility of Voting Systems and Products. NIST Special Publication.
Mebane, W. R. 2004. The wrong man is president! Overvotes in the 2000 presidential election in Florida. 
Perspectives on Politics. 2, 3, 525–535.
Nichols, S. M. and Strizek, G. A. 1995. Electronic Voting Machines and Ballot Roll-off. American Politics 
Quarterly. 23, 300–318.
Nielsen, J. and Levy, J. 1995. Measuring usability: Preference vs. performance. Communications of the ACM. 
37, 4, 66–75.
Norden, L., Kimball, D., Quesenbery, W., and Chen, M. 2008 Better ballots. Brennan Center for Justice at 
NYU School of Law.
52
USENIX Journal of Election Technology and Systems (JETS)
Volume 1, Number 1 • August 2013
Ohio Secretary of State. 2007. Project EVEREST: Risk Assessment Study of Ohio Voting Systems Executive 
Report. http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/upload/everest/00-SecretarysEVERESTExecutiveReport.pdf
Ryan, P. Y. A., Bismark, D., Heather, J., Schneider, S., Xia, Z. 2009. The Prêt à Voter veriﬁable election 
system. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 4, 662–673.
Stein, R. M., Vonnahme, G., Byrne, M., and Wallach, D. 2008. Voting technology, election administration, 
and voter performance. Election Law Journal. 7, 123–135.
Stewart, C. 2006. Residual Vote in the 2004 Election. Election Law Journal. 5, 158–169.
Traugott, M. W., Hanmer, M. J., Park, W.-h., Herrnson, P. S., Niemi, R. G., Bederson, B. B., and Conrad, F. 
G. 2005. The impact of voting systems on residual votes, incomplete ballots, and other measures of 
voting behavior. Annual conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL,. 7–10.
Wand, J. N., Shotts, K. W., Sekhon, J. S., Mebane, W. R., Herron, M. C., and Brady, H. E. 2001. The butterﬂy 
did it: The aberrant vote for Buchanan in Palm Beach County, Florida. American Political Science 
Review. 95, 4, 793–810.
